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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND SENTENCING
ANDRA LE RoUx-KEMP*
LEGISLATION
CRIMINAL LAW (FORENSIC PROCEDURES) AMENDMENT Acr 37 OF
2013
The Criminal Law (Forensic Procedures) Amendment Act 37 of
2013 was gazetted on 27 January 2014 in GG 37268 GN 52. This
Act provides for the taking of specified bodily samples from
certain categories of persons for the purposes of forensic DNA
analysis. All aspects with regard to the retrieval, storage and use
of DNA samples and profiles are furthermore regulated. It also
provides for the establishment and regulation of a National
Forensic DNA Database of South Africa by way of and in terms of
amended provisions in the South African Police Service Act 68 of
1995. The President, by proclamation in the Government Gazette
(Proc 89 in GG 38376 of 30 December 2014), announced that
the Criminal Law (Forensic Procedures) Amendment Act 37 of
2013 would come into operation on 31 January 2015.
SUPERIOR COURTS ACT 10 oF 2013
The following notices with regard to the Superior Courts Act 10
of 2013 were published in GG 37390 of 28 February 2014:
* Government Notice 147 - Norms and standards for the
performance of judicial functions
The norms and standards for the performance of judicial
functions was issued by the Chief Justice in terms of section 8 of
the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013 read with section 165(6) of the
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the Constitu-
tion). The objectives of these norms and directives are to 'achieve
the enhancement of access to quality justice for all; to affirm the
dignity of all users of the court system and to ensure the effective,
efficient and expeditious adjudication and resolution of all dis-
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putes through the courts, where applicable' (Preamble). The
norms and directives are furthermore binding on all judicial
officers and apply to all courts in the Republic of South Africa. The
core values that underpin the norms and standards include:
independence, equality and fairness, accessibility, transparency,
responsiveness and diligence.
The norms and standards cover a wide range of judicial
activities and provide, for example, for specific timeframes in
which civil and criminal matters should be finalised in High Courts
and magistrates' courts (para 5.2.5). It is furthermore recom-
mended that judgments in both civil and criminal matters not be
reserved without a fixed date for handing down (para 5.2.6), and
that case flow management be directed to enhance service
delivery and access to quality justice through the speedy finalisa-
tion of all matters (para 5.2.4).
* Government Notice 148 - Renaming of courts in terms of
section 6 of the Act
The Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013 created a single High Court
with various divisions in Grahamstown, Bhisho, Mthatha, Port
Elizabeth, Bloemfontein, four in Pretoria, Johannesburg, Pieter-
maritzburg, Durban, Kimberley, Mahikeng and Cape Town.
* Government Notice 149 - Determination of sittings of the
specific courts
A schedule indicating the terms and recesses of the courts up
to 2020 was published in terms of section 8(6) of the Superior
Courts Act 10 of 2013.
LEGAL AID SOUTH AFRicA ACT 39 OF 2014
The President assented to the Legal Aid South Africa Act 39 of
2014 in GG 38315 GN 1013 on 9 December 2014. This Act will
come into operation on a date fixed by the President by procla-
mation in the Gazette and aims to 'ensure access to justice and
the realisation of the right of a person to have legal representation
as envisaged in the Constitution and to render or make legal aid
and legal advice available'. To reach these goals and to perform
all functions related thereto, an entity 'Legal Aid South Africa' is
created in terms of the provisions of the Act.
Chapter 5 of the Act provides, inter alia, for legal aid by
direction of courts in criminal matters and states. It provides that
a court in criminal proceedings may only direct that a person be
provided with legal representation at state expense if the court
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has taken into account the personal circumstances of the
accused, the nature and gravity of the charge against the
accused, whether any other legal representation at state expense
is available or has been provided, and any other factor which in
the opinion of the court should also be taken into account
(s 22(1)(a)(i)-(iv)).
Section 22(1)(b) furthermore requires that the matter must also
have been referred to Legal Aid South Africa for evaluation and
recommendation and that such a decision by a court in criminal
proceedings is subject to section 22(3) of the Act which requires
that the accused must have applied for legal representation at
state expense, have been refused representation, have
exhausted his/her internal right to appeal within the structures of
Legal Aid South Africa (s 22(3)(a)), or have applied for legal
representation at state expense and have received no response
(s 22(3)(b)), or have been refused legal representation at state
expense by Legal Aid South Africa and the court is of the opinion
that there are particular circumstances that need to be brought to
the attention of Legal Aid South Africa (s 22(3)(c)).
Note should also be taken of section 19 which deals with the
protection of attorney-client privilege. In terms of section 19(1), a
private legal practitioner who has been instructed by Legal Aid
South Africa to represent an accused must, when requested to do
so by Legal Aid South Africa, grant access to the information and
documents contained in the file relating to the accused 'for the
sole purpose of conducting a quality assessment of the work
done by the legal practitioner'. Section 19(2) provides that the
information and documents will remain privileged information
against any other party 'as information between attorney and
client, despite having been made available to Legal Aid South
Africa'.
CASE LAW
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Sections 68(6) (b) and 89(1) of the National Road Traffic Act 93 of 1996
and the Unlawful Seizure of a Motor Vehicle
The vehicle of the applicant in Ngqukumba v Minister of Safety
and Security & others 2014 (2) SACR 325 (CC) was seized by
police after it was found that the chassis number of the vehicle
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had been tampered with, the original engine number had been
ground off, and the manufacturer's tag plate had been removed
from another vehicle and placed on the applicant's vehicle (para
[2]). While the Eastern Cape High Court, Mthatha, found the
manner in which the police had seized the applicant's vehicle
unlawful, it refused to return the vehicle to the applicant as
sections 68(6)(b) and 89(1) of the National Road Traffic Act 93 of
1996 make it a criminal offence for any person to be in posses-
sion of a vehicle whose engine and chassis numbers had been
tampered with (para [4]). The High Court consequently ordered
that the vehicle be retained by the police until it had been
re-registered in accordance with the National Road Traffic Act
(para [4]). The Supreme Court of Appeal confirmed this decision
and held that the police cannot lawfully release the vehicle, and
a court order to this effect would be 'no different than ordering
a person to be restored in the possession of his or her heroin
or machine gun which he or she may not lawfully possess'
(Ngqukumba v Minister of Safety and Security & others 2013 (2)
SACR 381 (SCA), para [15]).
As the unlawfulness of the seizure of the applicant's vehicle
was no longer in dispute, the Constitutional Court only had to
consider whether the applicant's cause of action to have his
vehicle returned to him could succeed given the fact that
possession of the vehicle would constitute an offence in terms of
sections 68(6)(b) and 89(1) of the National Road Traffic Act. In
this regard Justice Madlanga writing for the majority of the
Constitutional Court held that the provisions of the National Road
Traffic Act do not oust the applicant's right to invoke the common-
law mandament van spolie in having his property restored to him
(paras [14] [18]). A spoliation order 'is meant to prevent the taking
of possession otherwise than in accordance with the law' and all
that the applicant had to prove was that he was in possession of
the vehicle and that he had been deprived of his possession
unlawfully (paras [10] [13]).
The Constitutional Court also found that the Supreme Court of
Appeal proceeded from an erroneous premise in assuming that a
tampered vehicle is no different from 'an article the possession of
which could be unlawful under all circumstances' (para [15]).
Section 68(6)(b) of the National Road Traffic Act provides that
possession of a tampered vehicle would only be unlawful if the
possession was without lawful cause (para [15]). Therefore, a
harmonious reading of the common-law principle of the manda-
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ment van spolie and the provisions of the National Road Traffic
Act is not only possible, but also in line with section 39(2) of the
Constitution in promoting the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill
of Rights (para [18]). And such an harmonious reading should not
be construed as thwarting effective policing, as section 22 of the
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 provides for the seizure of
objects without a warrant where the facts and circumstances of a
particular case so require (para [19]).
With regard to this particular case, it was held that the
applicant's possession of the vehicle 'pursuant to its return in
terms of a court order would [therefore] only be unlawful if it were
established that he did not have lawful cause to possess it ...
[and this] . . . conclusion can only be reached after an enquiry
into the facts surrounding the applicant's possession' (para [21]).
This enquiry can furthermore not be held together with the
proceedings for a spoliation order as the aim and function for a
spoliation order is clear, 'the despoiler must restore possession
before all else' (para [21]). The respondents in this matter were
consequently ordered to return the seized motor vehicle to the
applicant's possession (para [23]).
INCARCERATION AS A GROUND FOR PREVENTING A CIAIM FOR
DAMAGES FOR, INTER AIA, WRONGFUL ARREST, MALICIOUS
PROSECUTION AND WRONGFUL DETENTION
The plaintiffs in Skom v Minister of Police & others, In Re:
Singatha v Minister of Police & another (285 & 284/2014) [2014]
ZAECBHC 6 (27 May 2014) were arrested on 11 June 2009,
appeared before a magistrate on 15 June 2009, and remained in
custody until they were discharged in terms of section 174 of the
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 on 5 December 2011. Both
plaintiffs consequently claimed damages, including for wrongful
arrest and malicious prosecution from the first defendant, and
from both defendants, damages for wrongful detention (para [1]).
In terms of the defendants' plea that the plaintiffs' claims had
already prescribed, the plaintiffs submitted that their incarcera-
tion from 11 June 2009 to 5 December 2011 prevented them from
instituting their claims (para [5]). The plaintiffs relied on section
13(1)(a) of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969 in this regard. This
provides for the delay of a prescription period under certain
circumstances, including that of 'superior force' (para [4]).
However, Justice Roberson for the Eastern Cape Local Divi-
sion, Bhisho, did not agree that the plaintiffs' incarceration
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constituted 'superior force' as envisaged in the Act. Both the
plaintiffs had been legally represented throughout their trial and
'their mere incarceration did not prevent them from giving instruc-
tions to an attorney to institute proceedings on their behalf' (para
[7]).
See Lombo vAfrican National Congress 2002 (5) SA 668 (SCA)
where incarceration was accepted as a form of 'superior force'
interrupting the running of prescription in terms of section
13(1)(a) of the Act. However, the Lombo case can be distin-
guished from the present matter in that the claimant in that case
was detained outside the borders of the Republic of South Africa.
PROSECUTORIAL ETHICS
Neither the common law nor any statute - including the
Criminal Procedure Act - provides for a prosecutorial code of
conduct and ethics (S v Masoka & another (140039) [2014]
ZAECPEHC 54 (17 July 2014) para [8]). How prosecutors fulfil
their functions in a criminal trial, their code of conduct, and the
ethical norms in prosecuting a case are 'mostly unwritten rules
having their origin in concepts of justice, fairness, morality and
equity' (para [9]). In South Africa, many of these rules have been
included in 'The Code of Conduct for members of the National
Prosecuting Authority' promulgated under section 22(6) of the
National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998 and published in
Government Gazette 33907 of 29 December 2010 (para [9]).
Interfring with witnesses for the defence
In a special review in terms of section 24(c) of the Supreme
Court Act 59 of 1959, Justice Alkema for the High Court Eastern
Cape Local Division, Port Elizabeth, in S v Masoka & another
(140039) [2014] ZAECPEHC 54 (17 July 2014) emphasised the
trite but fundamental rationale of a fair prosecution.
The purpose of a criminal trial is not to obtain a conviction at all
costs. The duty of a prosecutor is to gather all relevant informa-
tion and evidence, and then decide whether such evidence is
sufficient to result in a conviction. If not, the decision must be
made not to prosecute. If the evidence is sufficient, his/her duty is
to place all such evidence before the court. In cases where the
accused is represented by counsel or an attorney, the evidence
which the prosecutor does not intend to place before the court
must be made available to the accused's legal representative
before the trial commences. In cases where an accused is
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unrepresented, all such evidence, even evidence pointing to the
innocence of the accused, must be placed before the Court (para
[12]).
By the above remarks I do not intend to convey that the role of a
prosecutor is both to prosecute the State case and also to defend
the accused. A conviction must be sought and argued for firmly
and without fear or favour. However, it must be done in an
even-handed, open and honest manner always recognising an
accused's right to a fair trial (para [13]; also see S v Van der
Westhuizen 2011 (2) SACR 26 (SCA)).
The two accused in the Masoka case were jointly prosecuted
on a charge of robbery. Both pleaded not guilty and were
represented by the same attorney instructed by the Legal Aid
Board. Each of the two accused furthermore had an alibi attesting
to his whereabouts on the night in question (para [2]). It tran-
spired from the court record, however, that the prosecutor
contacted and obtained a witness statement from the second
accused's alibi witness without alerting the defence to this or
making the statement available to the defence. It was only after
the second accused had completed his evidence-in-chief that he
was confronted by the prosecutor with the statement taken from
his own alibi witness (para [5]).
This conduct by the prosecutor constituted a gross irregularity
and compromised the right of the accused to a fair trial (para
[17]). The prohibition on interference with the witness of the
opposing party is not a rule of ethics applicable to prosecutors
only, but it applies equally to private practitioners and investiga-
tors. In civil matters, where a legal representative interferes with
or attempts to influence an opposing party witness, that legal
representative may face an application to be struck from the roll
of advocates or attorneys (para [16]). And, where an accused
interferes with state witnesses he or she may be imprisoned
pending trial and bail may be refused (para [14]). It was
consequently ordered that the trials of the two accused be
separated and that the entire proceedings against the second
accused be set aside and his trial commence de novo before a
different magistrate minus the witness statement the prosecution
had solicited (paras [6] [19]).
Failing to assist an unrepresented accused in securing the presence of a
defence witness
Justice Goosen for the Eastern Cape High Court, Grahams-
town, in Sodede vS (A4656/2013, 2013000247) [2014] ZAECHGC
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59 (24 July 2014) again emphasised the importance of presiding
officers providing the necessary support and guidance to an
unrepresented accused. In this case the accused was convicted
of a breach of a protection order made in terms of the Domestic
Violence Act 116 of 1998 and was sentenced to 24 months'
imprisonment. It transpired from the court record, however, that
the accused had wanted to call his grandmother as a witness, but
that he had needed some assistance as she was sickly and not
very mobile. But despite the accused articulating his wish to call
his grandmother and the fact that she was sickly and immobile
and the accused himself was unrepresented and in custody,
neither the presiding officer in the court a quo, nor the prosecu-
tion was forthcoming with any advice or assistance (paras
[4]-[7]).
Justice Goosen found that '[b]y adopting the attitude that no
assistance would be rendered by the prosecution, or even by the
court, the court effectively precluded the accused from calling a
witness. That constitutes a gross irregularity which vitiated the
fairness of the trial' (para [11]). The conviction was consequently
set aside.
The acceptance of the factual basis of a guilty plea is binding on the
prosecution
The accused in Nkantini v S (M78/14 [2014] ZAECGHC 60
(24 July 2014)) pleaded guilty to and was convicted of stock theft
(two sheep) and sentenced to eighteen months' imprisonment.
However, on automatic review in terms of section 304 of the
Criminal Procedure Act, it transpired that the trial magistrate
relied during sentencing on a submission made by the prosecu-
tion that was contrary to that to which the accused had pleaded
guilty in his section 112 statement (para [3]).
In S v Mnisi 2009 (2) SACR 227 (SCA), it was held that the
acceptance of the factual basis for a plea of guilty is binding
upon the prosecution and if the prosecution intends to present
evidence to the contrary, that evidence must be led before
conviction (para [6]). Section 112(3) can only be used to present
evidence for the purpose of sentence and not to contradict the
accused's version of events accepted in his or her guilty plea
(para [6]).
The accused's sentence in the Nkantini case was conse-
quently set aside and the matter remitted to the trial magistrate for
afresh sentencing (para [8]).
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Conduct undermining the esteem of the office of the National Director of
Public Prosecutions
In Zuma v Democratic Alliance & others [2014] 4 All SA 35
(SCA), Justice Navsa for the Supreme Court of Appeal (with
Justices Mpati, Brand and Tshiqi concurring) put an end to the
protracted litigation between President Jacob Zuma, the office of
the National Director of Public Prosecutions (NDPP), and the
Democratic Alliance (DA). The DA had applied for an order
reviewing, correcting, and setting aside the decision of the office
of the NDPP to discontinue the prosecution of the appellant, and
for a declaration that the decision was inconsistent with the
Constitution. The DA also required that the record on which the
impugned decision was based be delivered to them (para [3]).
In the first appeal before the Supreme Court of Appeal -
Democratic Alliance & others v Acting National Director of Public
Prosecutions 2012 (3) SA 486 (SCA) - it was held that a decision
to discontinue a prosecution is an exercise of public power and
must therefore comply with the Constitution (Democratic Alliance
& others v Acting National Director of Public Prosecutions 2012
(3) SA 486 (SCA) para [27]). The court also ordered that the
record on which the impugned decision was based, excluding
those sections that would constitute a breach of confidentiality if
made available, be handed over to the DA for consideration
(Democratic Alliance & others vActing National Director of Public
Prosecutions 2012 (3) SA 486 (SCA) para [3.1.3]). This order had
to be complied with within fourteen days of the date of the
judgment (Democratic Alliance & others vActing National Direc-
tor of Public Prosecutions 2012 (3) SA 486 (SCA) para [4]).
This order was, however, not complied with and the DA
approached the North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria, for an order,
directing among other things that the record be produced as per
the Supreme Court of Appeal order (para [16]). In response the
Office of the Acting National Director of Public Prosecutions
(ANDPP) was silent as regards the confidentiality of the tapes
and transcripts, electing rather to lay its non-compliance with the
Supreme Court of Appeal order at the door of the appellant's
legal representatives, 'submitting that the present dispute was
due to [the latter] not being timeously forthcoming with a final
position on the disclosure of the tapes or the transcripts' (para
[18]). The ANDPP also submitted that the internal records -
including the memoranda, minutes of meetings, and notes - all
related to internal discussions and consultations leading up to the
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decision to discontinue the prosecution and that these docu-
ments 'deal specifically with what was conveyed both in writing
and orally in the representations submitted on behalf of the third
respondent and on the basis of confidentiality. Those issues are
inextricably linked with the recordings or transcripts. Thus all
these fall within the ambit of the SCA order and are covered by
the limitation for the production of the record' (para [19]). The
North Gauteng High Court again directed the appellant in this
present matter to comply with the Supreme Court of Appeal's
order (para [24]).
Considering the history of this matter and the answering
affidavit filed by the ANDPP, Justice Navsa for the Supreme Court
of Appeal (with Justices Mpati, Brand and Tshiqi concurring)
sharply criticised the office of the NDPP, describing their
response to the current appeal as 'disingenuous', based on
hearsay, endangering public confidence, and 'almost meaning-
less' (paras [26] [38]). It was held that the audio recordings did
not constitute written representations and that the recordings
came into existence long before the appellant made his repre-
sentations (para [30]). It was also held that the NDPP had sought
and obtained verification of the authenticity of the recordings
from the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) and that the NIA had
a copy of the recordings and had declassified the information. If,
therefore, any privilege attached to the recordings, it could only
be claimed by the NIA (para [30]). It was further accepted by the
appellant's legal counsel that the 'gist of those recordings,
namely that they contained a discussion involving the office of the
NDPP indicating that the decision to prosecute Mr Zuma was
politically inspired and constituted an abuse of power, had been
made public in 2009 by Mr Mpshe' (the ANDPP at the time of the
decision not to prosecute Mr Zuma) (para [30]).
With regard to the documents and information in possession of
the NDPP, it was held that while the initial Supreme Court of
Appeal order was not a blanket prohibition of disclosure, and
excluded matters that the appellant could rightly consider confi-
dential, an obligation to disclose existed in the absence of a
specific claim of privilege (para [36]). The office of the NDPP
'must engender public confidence' and 'the maintenance of
public confidence in the administration of justice required that it
be, and is seen to be, even-handed' (para [38]). With regard to
the NDPP's actions in this matter, it was said that
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[I]t is to be decried that an important constitutional institution such as
the office of the NDPP is loath to take an independent view about
confidentiality, or otherwise, of documents and other materials within
its possession, particularly in the face of an order of this court. Its lack
of interest in being of assistance to either the high court or this court is
baffling. It is equally lamentable that the office of the NDPP took no
steps before the commencement of litigation in the present case to
place the legal representatives of Mr Zuma on terms in a manner that
would have ensured either a definite response by the latter or a
decision by the NDPA on the release of the documents and material
sought by the DA. This conduct is not worthy of the office of the NDPP.
Such conduct undermines the esteem in which the office of the NDPP
ought to be held by the citizenry of this country (para [41]).
In terms of an agreement between the parties, it was held that
the original Supreme Court of Appeal order must be complied
with within five days of the date of the order in the matter currently
before the court, and that the internal documents in possession of
the NDPP be handed over to an arbitrator, to which both parties
agreed, to decide which portions thereof contain confidential
written and oral representations made by the appellant to the NPA
and should for that reason not be disclosed to the DA (para [42]).
MAUCIOUS PROSECUTION
Judge Zondi, writing for the majority of the Supreme Court of
Appeal in Minister of Safety and Security NO & another v
Schubach (437/13) [2014] ZASCA 216 (1 December 2014)
affirmed the requirements for a successful claim of malicious
prosecution as first formulated in Minister of Justice and Constitu-
tional Development & others v Moleko [2008] 3 All SA 47 (SCA)
para [8]
(a) that the defendants set the law in motion (instigated or
instituted the proceedings);
(b) that the defendants acted without reasonable and probable
cause;
(c) that the defendants acted with malice (or animo injuriandi);
and
(d) that the prosecution has failed.
The respondent in the Schubach case was a member of the
South African Police Service who had been arrested on informa-
tion received from an informer about various firearms and ammu-
nition which the respondent stored in a safe at offices under his
control (para [2]). The respondent was consequently detained
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and later appeared in court on charges relating to the unlawful
possession of firearms and ammunition, despite his explanation
that all the firearms and ammunition found were licensed and
owned either by him, his wife, or third parties for whom he was
holding them in safe custody (para [2]). Upon representations
made to the DPP, the Senior Public Prosecutor was instructed not
to pursue charges relating to the weapons and ammunition
belonging to the respondent and his wife, but only to charge the
respondent with regard to the weapons and.ammunition belong-
ing to the third parties, as well as some explosives found in the
safe and which the respondent indicated belonged to the SAPS
(paras [4] [5]). The DPP's instruction was, however, ignored and
the respondent was ultimately prosecuted for the unlawful pos-
session of all the firearms and ammunition found in the safe (para
[5]). Upon conclusion of the trial the respondent was acquitted of
all the charges (para [5]).
The respondent instituted a claim against the appellants for
damages sustained as a result of his alleged unlawful arrest and
malicious prosecution. At issue in this appeal, and with reference
to the requirements for proving a malicious prosecution as set out
above, was whether the determination of malice or a malicious
intent on the part of the prosecution required that the prosecution
decision be evaluated as a single intent and in its entirety, or be
evaluated separately with regard to each of the charges brought
against the respondent (para [12]). The DPP argued that 'the
decision to prosecute constitutes a single intent and a single act,
its reasonableness had to be evaluated in its entirety, and it was
thus wrong to conduct such an evaluation separately since it is
inconceivable that the prosecutor would have a malicious intent
for one set of charges and not for the other; he either has
malicious intent (animo injuriand) or not' (para [12]).
Judge Zondi did not agree. He explained that the test to
determine whether there has been malice on the part of the
prosecution contains both a subjective and an objective element,
in that there must be both an actual belief on the part of the
prosecutor, and that belief must furthermore be reasonable under
the circumstances (para [15]). The charges brought against the
respondent must therefore be considered separately 'in deter-
mining the absence of reasonable and probable cause. Consid-
erations pertaining to the one set of charges cannot be
transposed onto the other. In other words, the fact that there was
a reasonable and probable cause to prosecute on one set of
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charges has no effect on the outcome of the enquiry in relation to
the other set of charges. This is so, because the question whether
reasonable grounds for the prosecution exist is answered only by
reference to the facts of each case' (para [13]).
Judge Zondi also rejected the appellant's claim that section 42
of the National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998 creates legal
immunity for prosecutors who act and exercise their powers in
good faith. Section 42, it was held, only relates to bona fide
mistakes and does not offer protection against civil claims where
prosecutorial powers have been exercised maliciously (paras
[19] [20]). It was consequently found that the decision to pros-
ecute the respondent on certain of the charges he faced had
indeed been malicious and that this entitled him to the damages
claimed (para [20]).
Also see Minister of Safety and Security v Tyokwana (827/13)
[2014] ZASCA 130 (23 September 2014) and Minister of Police &
another v Du Plessis 2014 (1) SACR 217 (SCA) where it was held
that prosecutors must always act with objectivity and in the public
interest.
POWER OF THE JUDICIARY TO REVIEW PROSECUTORIAL DECISIONS
The applicant in Freedom Under Law v National Director of
Public Prosecutions & others 2014 (1) SACR 111 (GNP) applied
for the review and setting-aside of decisions by the NPA to
withdraw criminal and disciplinary charges against the fifth
respondent, Richard Mdluli, the Head of Crime Intelligence, and
immediately to reinstate the charges concerned and bring the
prosecution to finalisation (para [1]). The fifth respondent faced
eighteen counts including murder, attempted murder, kidnap-
ping, assault with the intent to do grievous bodily harm, defeating
the ends of justice, fraud, corruption, theft, and money-launder-
ing (para [27]).
In considering the structure of the NPA and the powers, duties
and functions of the various office bearers within the NPA, Judge
Murphy for the North Gauteng High Court Pretoria, referred to
both section 24 of the National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of
1998 and section 6 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.
Directors of Public Prosecutions have the power, in terms of
section 24 of the National Prosecuting Authority Act, to institute
and conduct criminal proceedings, and section 20(3) of the Act
also empowers DPPs to discontinue proceedings in terms of
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section 20(1)(c) of the Act. Likewise, section 6 of the Criminal
Procedure Act confers the power to withdraw charges or stop a
prosecution upon DPPs and prosecutors. Where charges are
withdrawn or a prosecution is stopped before an accused has
entered a plea, the accused is not entitled to an acquittal and the
charges may be reinstated at a future date (s 6(a)). On the other
hand, the stopping of a prosecution after a plea has been
entered, entitles the accused to an acquittal and to raise the plea
of autrefois acquit should the prosecuting authority attempt to
institute the same or substantially the same charges again (paras
[110] [111]). In addition to these legislative provisions on the
withdrawal charges and the stopping of prosecutions, the NDPP
has also - in terms of section 21 of the National Prosecuting
Authority Act 32 of 1998 - issued a policy manual containing
prosecution policy and policy directives on how and when
charges may be withdrawn and a prosecution stopped (paras
[112]-[116]).
Whether such prosecutorial decisions to withdraw charges and
stop prosecutions are reviewable in a court of law, was contested
by the NDPP. Judge Murphy for the North Gauteng High Court,
Pretoria, agreed that a false perception can easily arise 'that the
courts when exercising judicial review of prosecutorial decisions
may trespass illegitimately into the executive domain' (paras
[117]-[119]). Judge Murphy subsequently set out in great detail
the powers of the courts to review prosecutorial decisions to
show that this power is indeed clearly defined and consistently
exercised within the parameters set by the Constitution and
Parliament (para [120]).
The judge first emphasised that the NPA has a duty to
prosecute and a duty to continue a prosecution if a prima facie
case exists and if there is no compelling reason for the charges to
be withdrawn or for the prosecution to be stopped (para [121]). It
is furthermore constitutionally guaranteed that the NPA will be
independent and be able to exercise its functions without fear,
favour or prejudice (s 179(4) of the Constitution). However,
despite these considerations for judicial restraint, decisions not to
prosecute or to discontinue a prosecution are administrative
decisions and are indeed subject to review as to their legality and
rationality by courts (paras [126] [131] [132]; also see National
Director of Public Prosecutions vZuma 2009 (1) SACR 361 (SCA)
and Democratic Alliance & others v Acting National Director of
Public Prosecutions & others 2012 (3) SA 486 (SCA)). Legality
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review in this context is 'concerned with the lawfulness of
exercises of public power' and rationality as regards 'the relation-
ship between means and ends and asks whether means
employed are rationally related to the purpose for which the
power is conferred' (para [126]). Rationality, furthermore, reflects
on the processes and procedures followed and requires that
such processes and procedures are, as regards the governing
law and regulations, just, transparent and fair (para [127]).
With regard to counter-arguments by the respondents that in
exercising its power to review prosecutorial decisions a court will
ipso facto trespass on the executive domain, Judge Murphy held
that
... the preponderance of all the modalities of interpretation, the text,
historical intent, the ethos of our culture of justification, prudential and
structural considerations, and doctrine, points inexorably to the con-
clusion that it was the intention of Parliament, pursuant to its obligation
in section 33(3) of the Constitution to enact the Promotion of Adminis-
trative Justice Act 3 of 2000, (PAJA) that decisions not to prosecute or
to discontinue prosecutions would be subject to judicial review in
terms of PAJA (para [134]).. . . [T]he law enacted by Parliament, in
compliance with the obligation entrusted to it by the founders of our
Constitution, imposes a duty on judges to review certain prosecutorial
decisions. Far from trespassing into the executive domain, any judge
in the South African constitutional order who declines deferentially to
review a decision not to prosecute, in the mistaken belief that he or
she is mandated by the doctrine of the separation of powers to do so,
will ironically be acting in violation of the doctrine of the separation of
powers (para [137]).
It was ultimately found that the orders sought by the applicant
in this matter were appropriate, just and equitable. The various
decisions by the first and third respondents to withdraw the
charges against the fifth respondent were set aside, and the first
and third respondents were ordered to reinstate forthwith the
various charges levelled against the fifth respondent (paras
[239]-[241]).
However, in National Director of Public Prosecution & others v
Freedom Under Law 2014 (2) SACR 107 (SCA), Judge Brand,
writing for the majority of the Supreme Court of Appeal, held that
the exclusion of a decision to institute or to continue a prosecu-
tion from the ambit of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act
33 of 2000 in section 1 (if) of the Act must also be understood to
incorporate a decision not to prosecute or to discontinue a
prosecution (para [27]). In referring to Democratic Alliance &
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others v Acting National Director of Public Prosecutions & others
2012 (3) SA 486 (SCA), he held that the same policy consider-
ations that underlie prosecutorial decisions to institute prosecu-
tions, also underlie prosecutorial decisions not to prosecute or to
withdraw prosecutions (paras [25]-[27]). The decisions to pros-
ecute or not to prosecute belong, therefore, to the same genus
and, 'although on a purely textual interpretation the exclusion in
s 1 (ft) of PAJA is limited to the former, it must be understood to
incorporate the latter as well' (para [27]).
With regard to the first appellant's submission that the decision
not to prosecute was merely provisional and was made in terms
of section 6(a) and not section 6(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act,
it was held that a provisional decision not to prosecute is not
immune from judicial review. Even despite the provisions of
section 179(5)(d) of the Constitution, which require that such
decisions are subject to review by the NDPP, the proposition that
such 'provisional' decisions are, for this reason, not subject to
challenge, had to be rejected based on the principles of legality
and rationality (para [35]). It was also held that a decision to
withdraw a criminal charge in terms of section 6(a) of the Criminal
Procedure Act cannot be described as 'provisional' merely
because it can be reinstituted (para [43]).
Therefore, while the Supreme Court of Appeal agreed that
decisions not to prosecute or to discontinue a prosecution can
be subjected to judicial review, it held that such a review will be
limited to the grounds of legality and rationality, and cannot
be reviewed on the wider basis of the PAJA (para [27]). However,
the Supreme Court of Appeal fully agreed with the High Court
that the prosecutorial decisions taken in this matter be set aside
and the prosecutions and disciplinary proceedings be reinsti-
tuted (para [53]).
JUDICIAL CONDUCT
For a judicial code of conduct and ethics the 'Bangalore
Principles of Judicial Conduct 2002' were described by Judge
Vahed in Mkhize & others vS (AR 182/2013) [2014] ZAKZPHC 31
(13 May 2014) as 'the lodestar of values for the conduct of judicial
officers' (para [1]). The Bangalore Principles were developed by
the Judicial Integrity Group with the active participation of Justice
Langa and set out principles and guiding values for all persons
exercising judicial power, however designated (para [1]). Value 6
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of the Bangalore Principles deals with the competence and
diligence of judicial officers and provides that
6.6 A judge shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings
before the court and be patient, dignified and courteous in
relation to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers and others with
whom the judge deals in an official capacity. The judge shall
require similar conduct of legal representatives, court staff and
others subject to the judge's influence, direction or control.
In the Mkhize case, the way in which the magistrate conducted
the proceedings and the lack of order and decorum on her part
were sharply criticised. In dealing with the appeal Vahed J
commented on the numerous unwarranted remarks by the trial
magistrate, the unnecessary interventions on her part, and the
fundamental misdirections that she gave (para [21]). Judge
Vahed described the 'attitude and tone' of the magistrate as
'coming through quite plainly' and 'discourteous' (paras [25]
[26]). The magistrate also ignored the request by the appellant's
legal representative to present his closing argument on another
day, and then, only after having heard the closing arguments of
the second and third appellants' defence team, did she hear the
closing argument of the prosecutor, followed by that of the first
appellant's legal representative. Immediately on the conclusion
of his address, the magistrate pronounced her verdict in which
she found the appellants guilty (para [29]). This, according
to Judge Vahed, lent considerable weight to the claim as to the
magistrate's 'predisposition' against the appellants (para [30]).
At the sentencing proceedings the appellants were each sen-
tenced to fifteen years' imprisonment on the charge of robbery with
aggravating circumstances. To this, the magistrate added three
years each because, she stated, 'my life was threatened by some
members of your gangs, that is the information that I was given and
that is why I came here under police protection. It had nothing to
do with any other case that day, it was your case' (para [33]). This
conduct by the magistrate is unacceptable, falls far short of the
values outlined in the Bangalore Principles, and infringes on the
appellants' right to a fair trial, warranting that their convictions and
sentences be set aside (paras [34]-[37]).
CHAPTER 13 OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Acr 51 OF 1977
The correct procedure in terms of sections 77-79 of the Criminal Procedure
Act 51 of 1977
The accused in S v Thanda (140060, CA&R348/2014) [2014]
ZAECGHC 100 (7 November 2014) was charged with and
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convicted of murdering her husband. During the trial it emerged
that she might be suffering from a mental illness as her legal
representatives informed the court that she still believed her
husband to be alive, indicated that she still saw and spoke to him
regularly, and that she intended calling him as a witness in the
proceedings (para [2]). It was consequently ordered that the
case proceed under sections 77-79 of the Criminal Procedure
Act and an order was made in terms of sections 77(1) and 78(2)
of the Act that the accused be referred for psychological evalua-
tion as prescribed by section 79 of the Act (para [3]). At the
subsequent hearing, the presiding magistrate found, based on
the psychiatric report, that the accused was not capable of
understanding the proceedings so as to make a proper defence
and proceeded to find the accused guilty of murder. The magis-
trate also ordered that the accused be detained pending the
decision of a judge in Chambers in terms of section 47 of the
Mental Health Care Act 17 of 2002 (para [4]).
The psychiatric report - compiled by two psychiatrists and a
clinical psychologist - diagnosed the accused with psychotic
disorder (unspecified), alcohol dependence, and traumatic brain
injury and recommended that she be admitted to the Fort
England Hospital as a state patient in terms of section 42 of the
Mental Health Care Act 17 of 2002 (paras [8] [9]). This report was
submitted to the parties in terms of section 77(2) of the Criminal
Procedure Act and was accepted unopposed (paras [10] [11]).
Yet, the trial magistrate never considered the composition of the
psychiatric panel which had evaluated the accused. For
example, no order was granted specifically for appointing a
private psychiatrist, as is required by section 79(1)(b)(ii), or for
a psychiatrist specifically for the accused, as is required in
section 79(1)(b)(iii), or a clinical psychologist as contemplated
in section 79(1)(b)(iv) of the Criminal Procedure Act (para [12]). It
was also not clear whether the medical staff appointed to the
panel were in the employ of the state, or how they had been
identified and appointed to evaluate the accused (paras [13]
[14]). And finally, it was not apparent from the court record how it
had been determined that Fort England Hospital was the appro-
priate and designated hospital to which the accused should be
admitted (para [16]).
The Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions provided more
detailed information on the processes and procedures that had
been followed in terms of the J138A Form (headed 'Lasbrief tot
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oorplasing van 'n persoon wat aangehou word, na 'n inrigting, vir
ondersoek kragtens die bepalings van hoofstuk 13 van die
Strafproseswet 51 van 1977) (paras [18]-[22]). However, it was
also clear from this J138A Form that the provisions of section 79
of the Criminal Procedure Act regarding the appointment of the
panel and the psychiatric assessment of the accused had not
been followed and the psychiatric assessment of the accused
was consequently found to be irregular, warranting a remittal to
the regional court for the psychiatric assessment to be ordered
afresh in compliance with the provisions of section 79 of the Act
(paras [23] [24]).
A further irregularity in this case was that the accused was
found to be incapable of understanding the proceedings and
probably lacked criminal responsibility at the time of the alleged
offence. Yet, she was still convicted of murder without any
charges having been put to her and without requesting her to
enter a plea (paras [25] [26]). Moreover, the evidence against the
accused did not prove a prima facie case and there were many
uncertainties as to how exactly the deceased had sustained the
multiple and severe injuries, and whether the accused's version
of events could reasonably possibly be true (paras [28]-[37]).
Also see S v Luphuwana 2014 (1) SACR 503 (GJ) for an
exposition on the requirements of section 78 of the Criminal
Procedure Act.
Should an order in terms of section 78(6) (a) (ii) (aa) of the Criminal
Procedure Act 51 of 1977 read with section 37 of the Mental Health Care
Act 17 of 2002 be reviewed by a High Court?
The accused in Maluka vS(A197/2013) [2014] ZAGPPHC 862
(31 October 2014) was acquitted on charges of assault, sexual
assault and housebreaking with the intent to commit an offence
unknown to the state. This transpired after the accused had been
referred for observation in terms of section 78 of the Criminal
Procedure Act and the psychiatric report had revealed that he
suffered from schizophrenia and that despite his being able to
understand and participate in the legal proceedings against him,
was 'at the time of the alleged offence and as a consequence of
his mental illness, unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his
deeds or act in accordance with any appreciation of wrongful-
ness' (para [6]). The magistrate consequently ordered that the
accused be admitted to Weskoppies Hospital in terms of section
78(6)(a)(ii)(aa) of the Criminal Procedure Act as an involuntary
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mental health care user as contemplated in section 37 of the
Mental Health Act 17 of 2002 (para [7]). The matter was also
referred for special review in view of the decision in S v
Ramokoka 2006 (2) SACR 57 (W) where the court expressed the
view that magistrates should, as a matter of good practice, refer
their orders made in terms of section 77(6) to the High Court for
review (para [8]). However, since courts of the same stature of
this particular division had come to opposite conclusions (S v Van
Wyk 2000 (1) SACR 79 (T) and S v Wills 1996 (2) SACR 105 (T)),
the matter was referred to the Full Bench for a final decision on
whether an order in terms of section 78(6)(a)(ii)(aa) of the
Criminal Procedure Act read with section 37 of the Mental Health
Care Act 17 of 2002 should be reviewed by a High Court (para
[10]).
The automatic review procedure created by section 302 of the
Criminal Procedure Act was established to protect accused
persons sentenced to a term of imprisonment longer than three
months. It is triggered if the accused was unrepresented when
sentence was imposed; or, where the sentence exceeds three
months' imprisonment, the judicial officer imposing the sentence
has held the rank of magistrate for less than seven years; or,
where the sentence exceeds six months' imprisonment, the
judicial officer concerned has held the rank of magistrate for less
than seven years (para [15]). The question in this case was,
therefore, whether, given the aim of section 302 of the Criminal
Procedure Act to provide an additional layer of protection when a
person is deprived of his or her liberty, section 78(6)(ii)(aa) of the
Act should not also be accompanied by similar guarantees and
layers of protection (para [19]).
In S vZondi2012 (2) SACR 445 (KZP), the court disagreed with
the dictum in Ramokoka, and while it conceded that the review
powers of High Courts are extensive and include the power to
review orders made in terms of section 77(6) of the Criminal
Procedure Act, it also held that orders made in terms of section
78(6)(a)(ii)(aa) of the Act cannot be subject to an automatic
review as a matter of good practice. Any prejudice that may result
from such an order can rather be dealt with on appeal, or in terms
of an application under the Mental Health Care Act 17 of 2002 for
the discharge of the person involved (paras [25] [26]).
Judge Kollapen, writing for the majority of the North Gauteng
High Court, Pretoria, agreed with the decision in the Ramokoka
case and held that the potential of serious prejudice in the
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deprivation of liberty of those who are mentally ill in terms of the
said provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act, as well as the
Mental Health Care Act 17 of 2002, warrants some form of
automatic review. However, the judges also held that this is a
matter best left for the executive and legislature to consider (para
[39]). Until the legislature and the executive have adequately
addressed this in terms of their policy-making and legislative
functions, it was held that 'as a matter of good practice magis-
trates should refer orders made in terms of s 78(6)(ii)(aa) to the
High Court for review' (para [40]).
SECTIONS 162 AND 164 OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT 51 OF
1977
Section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Act provides that no
person shall give testimony as a witness in criminal proceedings
unless that person is under oath, administered by the appropriate
judicial or court official. An important caveat to this provision is
that if the presiding officer did not first establish that the witness
understands the nature and importance of the oath, the testimony
so given will be inadmissible (para [7]; S v Matshivha 2014 (1)
SACR 29 (SCA)).
Exceptions to this general principle are provided for in sections
163 and 164 of the Act. Section 163 of the Criminal Procedure Act
allows for unsworn testimony to be admissible in lieu of an
affirmation that the witness speak the truth. Such an affirmation is
typically used where the witness refuses to take the oath for
religious reasons, or objects to taking the oath, or to taking the
oath in the prescribed form, or does not consider the oath binding
on his or her conscience. The affirmation to speak the truth is then
taken at the direction of the judicial or other court official and has
the same legal force as if the witness had indeed taken the oath.
Section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Act further allows for
unsworn or unaffirmed evidence to be admitted if the witness is
unable to understand the nature and import of the oath or
affirmation but has been admonished by the presiding judicial
officer to speak the truth.
See G v S(CA&R 133/2012) [2014] ZAECGHC 112 (19 Novem-
ber 2014) for a case in which it was alleged that the magistrate
had failed to determine whether the two complainants in a sexual
offences matter were able to distinguish between truth and
untruths, and whether they understood the importance of telling
the truth. In this case it was found that the magistrate's question-
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ing with regard to the complainants' level of schooling and
comprehension was adequate to establish whether they were
able to distinguish between truth and untruth and understood the
importance of telling the truth (paras [5] [18]).
But in another case, Rammbuda v S (156/14) [2014] ZASCA
146 (26 September 2014), the magistrate's questioning of the
complainants was found to have been inadequate as it had failed
to establish whether the child was able to distinguish between
truth and untruth and 'had a proper appreciation of these abstract
concepts "truth" and "untruth" and was thus a competent wit-
ness' (para [8]). In this case it was also held that cautioning a
child to tell the truth was not sufficient to satisfy the requirements
of section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Act as there is a duty on
the presiding officer to admonish the child to speak the truth
(para [8]).
APPLYING FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL AGAINST A CONVICTION AND/OR A
SENTENCE
The various provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977
In Dexter vS (P223/2013) [2014] ZAFSHC 77 (12 June 2014),
Judge van Zyl set out the rules governing applications for leave to
appeal against a conviction and/or sentence, as well as applica-
tions for leave to adduce further evidence. This discussion will
only provide a synopsis of the relevant rules and will not deal with
the merits and final judgment in this particular case.
Section 309(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977
provides that a person convicted of an offence by any lower court
may appeal the conviction and sentence, subject to leave to
appeal being granted under section 309B or 309C of the Act
(para [9]). Section 309B(1)(a) further provides that, subject to
section 84 of the Child Justice Act 75 of 2008, an accused who
wishes to note an appeal against a conviction or sentence must
apply to that court for leave to appeal against his or her conviction,
sentence or order (para [9]). Leave to appeal must, therefore, first
be obtained from the trial court (para [10]). (Further remedies are
available to an accused in terms of the Criminal Procedure Act
where such leave has been applied for but has been refused.)
With regard to an application for leave to adduce further
evidence, section 309B(5)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act
provides that the application must be brought together with an
application for leave to appeal (para [12]; also see the Magis-
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trates' Courts Rule 67). It is, therefore, evident that an application
for leave to present further evidence should also be made to the
trial court at the stage when the relevant application for leave to
appeal is made (para [14]). Moreover, once an application for
leave to appeal has been disposed of, the trial court will be
unable to consider an application to lead further evidence (para
[17]). Exceptions hereto can, however, be found in section
304(2)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act, which allows for a court
of appeal to hear evidence or to remit the case to the magistrate
with the discretion to hear further evidence (s 304(2)(c)(v)), as
well as in section 22(a) of the Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959
which empowers the Supreme Court of Appeal and the provincial
or local division itself to hear evidence or to remit the matter to the
court a quo for that purpose (para [19]; also see S v Ross 2013
(1) SACR 77 (WCC)). These exceptions apply when a High Court
is hearing an application for leave to appeal in a matter which
emanated from a lower court. In such circumstances the High
Court is not the court of appeal (para [20]).
Finally, with regard to an application for leave to appeal against
the refusal of the petition for leave to appeal against a sentence, it
was held that the test to be applied by the Supreme Court of
Appeal in such a matter is 'whether there are reasonable pros-
pects of success in the envisaged appeal and if so, it will refer the
matter back to the High Court to be heard by two judges as
appeals emanating from lower courts are dealt with' (para [22];
also see S v Kriel 2012 (1) SACR 1 (SCA)). And, if such an
application for leave is refused, the applicant can bring a direct
petition to the President of the Supreme Court of Appeal (para
[23]; also see S v Khoasasa 2003 (1) SACR 123 (SCA)).
The previous Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959 versus the new Superior
Courts Act 10 of 2013
Under the previous provisions of the Supreme Court Act 59 of
1959, an appellant convicted in a regional court first applied for
leave to appeal from the trial court, in terms of section 309B of
the Criminal Procedure Act. If this application was refused, the
appellant petitioned the Judge President of a Provincial Division
in terms of section 309C of the Criminal Procedure Act. And,
where such an application is refused by two judges of the
Provincial Division, the appellant petitioned the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court of Appeal for leave to appeal. A refusal of
such an application for leave to appeal by two judges of the
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Provincial Division of a High Court was furthermore regarded as a
'judgment', 'order', or 'ruling' of that Provincial Division as
intended in sections 20(1) and 21(1) of the Supreme Court Act 59
of 1959. Furthermore, the order of a court a quo in which leave to
appeal has been refused, was likewise regarded as an order of
that court as intended in section 20(3) of the Supreme Court Act
59 of 1959. The Supreme Court of Appeal in S v Khoasasa 2003
(1) SACR 123 (SCA) further held that the application directed at
the Judge President of a Provincial Division for leave to appeal
against a conviction or sentence in a lower court after such leave
has been refused by the lower court, was not, in terms of section
309C of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, the appeal
against the conviction and/or sentence itself, but was rather an
appeal against the magistrate's refusal of leave to appeal. In
other words, it was directed at correcting what the appellant
regarded as an incorrect decision in the lower court to refuse the
leave to appeal. It therefore followed that the Supreme Court of
Appeal could only hear an application for leave to appeal where
the court a quo had refused such an application and the
applicant had applied for leave to appeal with the Supreme Court
of Appeal. (Also see Matshona vS [2008] ZASCA 58; Hibbert vS
[2011] ZASCA 18; AD vS [2011] ZASCA 215; Mkhize vS [2012]
ZASCA 74; Thekiso v S [2012] ZASCA 129; and Matshona v S
[2008] ZASCA 58.)
The Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959 has been repealed by the
Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013 which came into force on
23 August 2013, and sections 16 and 17 of this new Act regulate
appeal procedures. 'Appeal' in terms of the new Act is defined as
'. . . an appeal in a matter regulated in terms of the Criminal
Procedure Act 51 of 1977. . ., or in terms of any other criminal
procedural law' (para [12]). And, since the Criminal Procedure
Act contains no provisions regulating appeals from the decision
of a full bench (2 judges) of a High Court, Vahed J held - in
Mthethandaba vS 2014 (2) SACR 154 (KZP) - that the rationale
of the Khoasasa case still applies: a petition in terms of section
309C of the Criminal Procedure Act, heard by two judges of a
High Court, should be regarded as an appeal against an
incorrect decision of a lower court, and any appeal against a
refusal of that petition lies to the Supreme Court of Appeal only
with the special leave of the Supreme Court of Appeal (para [14]).
This was also confirmed in Van Wyk v S, Galela vS [2014] 4 All
SA 708 (SCA).
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THE LANGUAGE MEDIUM OF CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
At issue in S v D/amini (DR224/14) [2014] ZAKZPHC 60
(9 December 2014) was whether any of the eleven official
languages could be used at any stage in criminal proceedings at
the instance of an accused or the discretion of the court, or
whether one specific language of record should be prescribed
for court proceedings (para [1]). The entire proceedings in this
case were conducted in isiZulu at the direction of the magistrate
who explained that most of the population in the rural area where
the court was situated spoke Zulu; that all the parties involved in
the case were Zulu speaking; and that the Constitution called for
the recognition and equality of all eleven official languages
(paras [4] [5]). Section 6(1) of the Magistrates' Court Act 32 of
1944 further provides that any of the official languages may be
used at any stage of the proceedings in any court and the
evidence shall also be recorded in the language so used (para
[7]). And, section 35(3)(k) of the Constitution stipulates that 'every
accused person has a right to a fair trial, which includes the right
to be tried in a language that the accused person understands or,
if that is not practicable, to have the proceedings interpreted in
that language'.
However, Ndlovu J for the KwaZulu-Natal High Court, Pieterma-
ritzburg, described the ideal of having every court operating in
the language predominantly used in its area or region as 'elusive'
and 'impracticable' (para [12]). He also reminded that the consti-
tutional provision as set out in section 35(3)(k) (see above), does
not confer a right on an accused to have the proceedings
conducted in a language of his or her choice (para [10];
Mthethwa v De Bruin NO & another 1998 (3) SA BCLR 336 (N)).
The language used in a court is rather at the behest of the
presiding officer with due regard to an accused's right to a fair
trial.
It was further held that the ideal of achieving fully multilingual
courts in South Africa will require proper planning and logistical
management, which is also recognised in the Constitution where
it is said that 'any process aimed at realising and implementing
the Constitutional imperative of promoting the use of indigenous
languages in court proceedings should be embarked upon
taking into account usage, practicality, expense, regional circum-
stances and the balance of the needs and preferences of the
population as a whole or in the province concerned' (para [13]
quoting s 6(3)(a) of the Constitution; also see s 4 of the Use of
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Official Languages Act 12 of 2012). It was consequently con-
cluded that while it is within a magistrate's power to order that
criminal proceedings be conducted in any of the official lan-
guages, such decisions are likely to have administrative and/or
budgetary implications and cannot, at this stage, be decided on
a whim, but should rather be resolved and determined by a
competent authority at a future date (para [22]).
AUDIO AND AUDIo-VISUAL BROADCASTING, As WELL AS PERMISSION
TO MAKE AND PUBLISH PHOTOGRAPHIC MATERIAL OF A CRIMINAL
PROCEEDING
In Multichoice (Proprietary) Limited & others v National Pros-
ecuting Authority & another, In Re; S v Pistorius, In Re; Media 24
Limited & others v Director of Public Prosecutions North Gauteng
& others 2014 (1) SACR 589 (GP), Judge Mlambo for the North
Gauteng High Court, Pretoria, had to decide an application by
the electronic, broadcast and print media of South Africa to
broadcast the entire criminal trial in the matter of State v Oscar
Pistorius (CC113/2013) [2014] ZAGPPHC 793 (12 September
2014). This decision required that the rights of an accused
person to a fair trial be weighed against the public's rights to have
insight into criminal proceedings, for proceedings to be open and
transparent to the public, and the rights of the media, particularly
the right to freedom of expression (para [1]).
The media argued that the Pistorius trial had 'captured the
attention and imagination of both the South African and interna-
tional communities' and it was, therefore, in the public interest
that they be broadcast to 'record and inform . .. communities of
the trial proceedings as exhaustively as possible' (para [4]). It
was also asserted that section 16 of the Constitution guarantees
every person and entity freedom of expression, including the
freedom of the press and other media to receive and disseminate
information (para [6]).
Pistorius, on the other hand, argued that the live broadcast of
his criminal trial would infringe on his right to a fair trial, as 'the
mere knowledge of the presence of audio visual equipment,
especially cameras, will inhibit him as an individual as well as his
witnesses when they give evidence . . . [and] Counsel may also
be inhibited in the questioning of witnesses and the presentation
of his case' (para [12]). Pistorius also argued that should his trial
be televised, it would enable witnesses yet to testify to fabricate
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and adapt their evidence based on their knowledge of what other
witnesses had already testified (para [12]).
This is not the first case in which a South African court has had
to grapple with the issue of extending the media's coverage in
South African courts. In Dotcom Trading 121 Pty Limited t/a Live
Africa Network News v King NO & others 2000 (4) SA 973 (C), the
audio broadcasting of the proceedings before the King Commis-
sion established to investigate match-fixing in South African
cricket was allowed, as it was held that to 'prevent the radio
broadcaster from recording the evidence is to deprive him of that
advantage over the print media' (para [43] of the Dotcom case).
In SA Broadcasting Corporation Ltd v Thatcher & others [2005] 4
All SA 353 (C), limited coverage of the Thatcher criminal trial was
granted to the broadcast industry as the court balanced the right
to privacy against the right to freedom of the press and freedom
of expression and emphasised that courts have an inherent
discretion to regulate its own proceedings (para [31] of the
Thatcher case). However, in South African Broadcasting Corpo-
ration Limited v Downer SC NO & others [2007] 1 All SA 384 SCA,
the Supreme Court of Appeal refused an application by the SABC
to televise and sound-record the appeal proceedings. This
decision was confirmed by the Constitutional Court in South
African Broadcasting Corporation Ltd v The National Director of
Public Prosecutions & others 2007 (1) SA 523 (CC).
What is evident from these cases is that in considering the
issue of allowing greater media presence and coverage of criminal
proceedings, a court must decide how best to accommodate
parties' competing rights whilst exercising its discretion to regulate
its own proceedings in a manner that is just and fair. This task was
articulated by the Supreme Court of Appeal as follows in Midi
Television Pty Limited t/a E-TV & others v Director of Public
Prosecutions (Western Cape) 2007 (5) SA 540 SCA para [9].
Where constitutional rights themselves have the potential to be
mutually limiting - in that the full enjoyment of one necessarily
curtails the full enjoyment of another and vice versa - a court
must necessarily reconcile them. They cannot be reconciled by
purporting to weigh the value of one right against the value of the
other and then preferring the right that is considered to be more
valued, and jettisoning the other, because all protected rights
have equal value. They are rather to be reconciled by recognis-
ing a limitation upon the exercise of one right to the extent that it is
necessary to do so in order to accommodate the exercise of the
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other (or in some cases, by recognising an appropriate limitation
upon the exercise of both rights) according to what is required by
the particular circumstances and within the constraints that are
imposed by section 36.
In considering the arguments by both Pistorius and the applicants in
this present matter, Judge Mlambo emphasised the following (para
[21]):
* Only a small segment of the community has access to Twitter and
can stay abreast of what is happening in the courtroom via this
means.
* The community at large is dependent on the media for news and to
be informed of what is happening in the courtroom.
* The summarised versions of court proceedings that journalists
usually produce have 'been correctly categorised as second
hand, liable to be inaccurate as they also depend on the under-
standing and views of the reporter or journalist covering the
proceedings' (para [21]).
Judge Mlambo consequently held that arguments which seek
to entrench the workings of the justice system away from the
public domain cannot be supported, especially not in light of
sections 34 and 35(3)(c) of the Constitution which requires that
legal proceedings, including criminal proceedings, be account-
able, transparent and open to the public (para [23]). It was
consequently ordered that audio coverage of the entire criminal
trial be allowed, but that audio-visual (television) and still photog-
raphy of the accused and the witnesses not be allowed as this
has the potential to deprive the accused (Pistorius) of a fair trial in
that he and the witnesses may be influenced by this in giving their
testimony (paras [25] [26]).
APPOINTMENT OF ASSESSORS AND SECTION 93ter(1) (a) OF THE
MAGISTRATES' COURTS AcT 32 OF 1944
The matter of S v D/adla (A583/14) [2014] ZAGPPHC 927
(14 August 2014) was referred for review in terms of section 304A
of the Criminal Procedure Act after a point in limine had been
raised that the accused in this matter had not been informed,
before she pleaded, that she could opt for assessors to be
included in the constitution of the court (para [4]). The acbused
was charged with murder and attempted murder, and section
93ter(1)(a) of the Magistrates' Courts Act 32 of 1944 provides for
the appointment of two assessors before evidence has been led
and if the judicial officer deems it expedient for the administration
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of justice. Section 93ter(l)(b) furthermore provides for the
appointment of assessors when a court is considering a commu-
nity-based punishment, or where an accused is charged with
murder in any regional court. In the latter instance the language
of the provision is mandatory and states that the judicial officer in
such a case shall be assisted by two assessors unless the
accused requests that the trial proceed without assessors,
whereupon it falls within the judicial officer's discretion to appoint
one or two assessors to assist him.
Failure to appoint assessors in terms of section 93ter(1)(a) was
considered in S v Naicker 2008 (2) SACR 54 (N) where Justice
Holmes came to the conclusion that it is not a fatal irregularity that
would render the proceedings a failure of justice per se (para
[9]). In S v Du Plessis 2012 (2) SACR 247 (GSJ), however, it was
held that failure to comply with section 93ter(1)(a) results in an
irregularity per se which cannot be waived or condoned by the
accused or his or her legal representative, and that a trial court
has no discretion to do with or without assessors in a murder trial,
unless the accused has specifically relieved the court of this duty
to appoint assessors (para [10]).
Maumela J for the North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria, con-
firmed that irregularities in criminal proceedings can be reviewed
under section 304 of the Criminal Procedure Act, even in
instances where a conviction has not been made, and especially
in the case of non-compliance with section 93ter (para [16]; also
see Magistrate, Stutterheim v Mashiya 2004 (5) SA 209 (SCA)).
And with regard to the differing decisions in the cases of Naicker
and Du Plessis it was held that lower courts such as magistrates'
courts are bound by decisions of any division of a High Court and
the stare decisis doctrine therefore requires compliance with the
decision in S v Du Plessis 2012 (2) SACR 247 (GSJ). The present
case was consequently remitted back to the regional court for the
proceedings to start afresh before a different magistrate (para
[24]).
SECTION 7(1) (A) OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT 51 OF 1977 AND
THE INABILITY OF JURISTIC PERSONS TO INSTITUTE PRIVATE
PROSECUTIONS
In National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v
Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development & another
(29677/2013) [2014] ZAGPPHC 763 (8 October 2014), the appli-
cant sought an order declaring section 7(1)(a) of the Criminal
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Procedure Act unconstitutional insofar as it does not allow for
juristic persons to institute private prosecutions (para [1]). The
applicant, a statutory body working for the prevention of the
ill-treatment of animals, indicated that its inability to use this
provision in the Criminal Procedure Act to initiate private prosecu-
tions where the state has declined to do so, was frustrating its
efforts to perform its statutory duties (para [3]). The applicant also
argued that there was no apparent rational basis for treating
juristic persons differently from natural persons in this regard
(para [4]).
However, Judge Fourie for the North Gauteng High Court,
Pretoria, did not agree. He rather emphasised the importance of
having a single National Prosecuting Authority tasked with, and
empowered to institute criminal proceedings on behalf of, the
state and to carry out any necessary functions incidental thereto
(para [12]). The exception allowed in this regard under sections 7
and 8 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 for natural
persons and public bodies to institute private prosecutions under
certain circumstances and if specific conditions are met, were
furthermore found to be justifiably limited to exclude all persons
and other entities who do not have a personal interest linked to
some injury suffered, from (not) instituting a prosecution (para
[26]). This limitation is important, it was held, 'to ensure proper
statutory control, to achieve criminal justice and to comply with
the constitutional imperative as far as a single National Prosecut-
ing Authority is concerned' (para [27]).
The judge also indicated that section 6(2)(e) of the Societies for
the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 169 of 1963 should be
amended specifically to confer the right of a public prosecution
upon the applicant, as is envisaged and provided for in section 8
of the Criminal Procedure Act with regard to private prosecutions
by public bodies.
PURPOSE OF A SPECIAL ENTRY IN TERMS OF SECTION 317 OF THE
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT 51 OF 1977
In Makumbane & others v S (46/2013) [2014] ZASCA 116
(18 September 2014), Justice Wallis for the majority of the
Supreme Court of Appeal warned that section 317 of the Criminal
Procedure Act cannot be used to 'enable the applicants to
reopen the case in order to give the evidence that they elected
not to give at the trial' (para [7]). A special entry in terms of section
317 of the Act can only be made by the trial judge, and while such
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a special entry may require evidence to be led of the irregularity
insofar as it does not appear from the court record, it cannot, for
example, be used to overcome failure to testify at the trial.
STATE DouNus Lrris IN ELECTING CHARGES TO BE PREFERRED
AGAINST THE ACCUSED
The state in S v Sehoole (730/13 [2014] ZASCA 155 (29 Sep-
tember 2014) appealed against a decision of the South Gauteng
High Court, Johannesburg, to set aside the respondent's convic-
tion on charges relating to sections 3 and 90 of the Firearms
Control Act 60 of 2000. In setting aside the respondent's convic-
tion and sentence, the court held that a person found in unlawful
possession of a firearm of which the serial number had been filed
away can only be charged with having contravened section
4(1)(f)(iv) of the Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000 and not section 3
of the Act (para [2]). An acquittal was consequently warranted,
according to the South Gauteng High Court, if an accused had
been charged under the incorrect section of an Act (para [5]).
Judge Mbha, writing for the majority of the Supreme Court of
Appeal, did not agree and emphasised that the state remains
dominus litis with regard to the prosecution and all pre-trial
procedures, including the decisions whether to prosecute, on
what charges to prosecute, in which court or forum, and when to
withdraw charges (para [10]). It is also within the state's discre-
tion to charge a person with a less serious offence (para [10] and
see S v Khalema and five similar cases 2008 (1) SACR 165 (C)).
Courts are generally not allowed to interfere with this prosecuto-
rial discretion unless there are truly exceptional circumstances to
warrant such interference (para [12]).
With regard to the provisions of sections 3 and 4 of the
Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000, it was held that section 3
contains a general prohibition against the unlawful possession of
a firearm, while section 4 deals with more specific cases of
unlawful possession, for example where the serial number of a
firearm has been removed (para [8]). Section 4 also attracts a
harsher penalty of up to 25 years' imprisonment compared to the
maximum penalty of fifteen years for a conviction of having
contravened section 3 of the Act (para [8]).
The matter was consequently remitted to the South Gauteng
High Court, Johannesburg, to hear the respondent's appeal de
novo.
Also see S v Swartz 2014 (1) SACR 461 (NCK) where it was
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held that in terms of a correction of a plea of guilty as provided for
in section 113 of the Criminal Procedure Act, and where the
judicial officer does not accept a plea of guilty on an alternative
charge and orders the trial to proceed, that such a trial may
proceed on the original charges and not on the alternative
charges to which the accused had pleaded guilty, unless the
prosecutor indicates otherwise (paras [40] [41]).
See, too, S v Ncoko 2014 (1) SACR 607 (ECG) and S v
Mhlambiso & another 2014 (1) SACR 610 (ECG), where it was
held that new charges may not be added to a charge sheet after
evidence had been led. Section 81(1) of the Criminal Procedure
Act merely provides for the joining of further charges to the
original charge in the same proceedings against an accused
after the accused has pleaded but before evidence has been led
as to the original charge (para [7]). In the Mhlambisa case, it was
held that 'there is no provision in the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of
1977 which permits the joining of further charges in the same
proceedings against an accused after evidence had already
been adduced at the trial' (paras [5] [6]). A new charge can only
be added to the charge sheet before the commencement of
evidence (para [7]).
THE COURT'S POWER TO SUBPOENA A WITNESS IN TERMS OF SECTION
186 OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT 51 OF 1977
Judges Bosielo and Mathopo in a minority judgment for the
Supreme Court of Appeal in Ngobeni vS (741/13) [2014] ZASCA
59 (2 May 2014) emphasised the importance of the court's power
to subpoena a witness in terms of section 186 of the Criminal
Procedure Act, and for justices to be proactive without compro-
mising their impartiality, and to 'call for the relevant evidence,
particularly where they are of the view that such a course is
necessary to ensure a just outcome' (para [36]).
The appellant in this case was convicted of attempted murder
and sentenced to four years' imprisonment in terms of section
276(1)(i) of the Criminal Procedure Act. The circumstances giving
rise to this conviction occurred after a road rage incident
between the appellant and the complainant in which the appel-
lant averred that he had fired a shot in self-defence and did not
realise that he had shot someone. The complainant, on the other
hand, alleged that the appellant had shot at him directly and
intentionally (para [3]).
The contradictions between the versions offered by the com-
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plainant and the appellant and their respective witnesses were
further exacerbated by an inconclusive medical report (J88).
While the medical practitioner indicated that the complainant had
been shot from behind, question marks under the rubric 'clinical
findings' - which is meant to set out the findings with regard to
the entry and exit wounds - shed doubt on whether the medical
practitioner was indeed able to distinguish conclusively which of
the two wounds was the entry wound and which the exit wound
(para [3]). This was important as a rear entry wound would
support the complainant's version of events, while a frontal entry
wound would support the appellant's version that he had acted in
self-defence.
While Judge Shongwe, writing for the majority, agreed that the
trial court should have called the medical practitioner to testify at
the trial and explain the question marks, it was also found that the
failure to call the medical practitioner was not fatal to this case as
direct and corroborated evidence supported the complainant's
version of events (para [6]). Delivering a minority judgment,
Judges Bosielo and Mathopo disagreed and held that it was
clear that the regional magistrate had relied on the medical report
in rejecting the appellant's defence and that this medical report
was not conclusive, as the question marks made by the medical
practitioner indicated that he was in doubt about certain aspects
of the bullet wounds (paras [32] [33]).
Faced with such inconsistency on an issue crucial to the
outcome of the case, the magistrate should have called the
medical practitioner to testify and clarify the uncertainty in terms
of section 186 of the Criminal Procedure Act (para [34]). Judges
Bosielo and Mathopo emphasised that there is an inquisitorial
element to criminal proceedings and that this is important to avert
the possibility of injustice 'which might occur should a court
remain supine in the face of a need to be proactive to obtain the
necessary evidence' (para [38]). In this case, the regional
magistrate was said to have erred in accepting the medical
report without any further enquiry (para [39]).
SENTENCING
CONsTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF SECTION 50 (2) (A) OF THE CRIMINAL
LAw (SEXUAL OFFENCES AND RELATED MATTERs) AMENDMENT ACT
32 OF 2007
Section 50(2) of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and
Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007 requires of a court to
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order that the particulars of a person convicted of a sexual
offence against a child or mentally disabled person be included
in the National Register for Sex Offenders. The matter of J v
National Director of Public Prosecutions & another 2014 (2) SACR
1 (CC) raised the question, however, whether the rights of a child
offender are duly recognised and protected in terms of this
provision. This is a particularly pertinent question given the
far-reaching consequences of having one's particulars included
in the National Register for Sex Offenders and the fact that courts
have no discretion in this regard (paras [41] [42]).
In addition to the general stigma that attaches to having one's
name included in the National Register for Sex Offenders, the
following adverse consequences and limitations are specifically
set out in the Sexual Offences Act: section 41(1) provides, for
example, that a person whose details have been entered in the
Register may not be employed to work with children under any
circumstances; he or she may also not gain access to a child or
places where children are present or congregate (s 41(1)(a) and
(b)). Such a person may also not hold a position related to his or
her employment or participate in practices for commercial gain,
which place him or her in any position of authority, supervision, or
care of a child, or become a foster parent, kinship caregiver,
temporary safe caregiver, or adoptive parent of a child (s 41(1)(b)
and (d)). Furthermore, a person whose details have been entered
onto the Register may not be granted a licence or be given
approval to manage or operate any entity, business or trade that
relates to supervision over, or care of children or places where
children are present or congregate (s 41(1)(c)). Likewise, section
40 of the Sexual Offences Act places corresponding limitations
on the rights of employers and licensing authorities to grant
persons whose details have been entered in the Register any
access or rights or privileges as described above.
Two further provisions of the Sexual Offences Act that also
relate to the mandatory inclusion of this specific category of sex
offenders' details on the National Register, and the concomitant
adverse consequences, is section 51(2) which provides that
persons sentenced to a period of imprisonment of more than
eighteen months, or who have two or more convictions for a
sexual offence against a child or mentally disabled person, may
never have their details removed from the Register. Section
51(1)(a)-(b) provides for the removal of a person's details from
the Register, but only under limited circumstances and in terms of
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the provisions of the Act. An offender is further obliged to disclose
any convictions for sexual offences against children or persons
with mental disabilities to an employer, licensing authority or
childcare authority, even if their details are no longer included in
the Register. Failure to do so may result in a criminal sanction
(ss 46, 47(2) and 48(2)). These limitations are exacerbated when
dealing with a child sex offender who committed the sexual
offences while still under the age of eighteen, but will experience
the adverse consequences of having his or her name included in
the Register for the remainder of his or her life (paras [43] [44]).
However, while these limitations on the rights of convicted
sexual offenders guilty of sexual offences against children or
mentally disabled persons are far-reaching, the legitimate consti-
tutional aim of the Sexual Offences Act in general, and the strict
and mandatory provisions with regard to the National Register for
Sex Offenders in particular, can also not be ignored. The over-
arching aim of the Sexual Offences Act is to protect victims of
sexual offences, and particularly child or mentally impaired
victims. The mandatory inclusion of the particulars of sexual
offenders who have committed certain sexual offences against a
child or mentally impaired person in the Register is, therefore, to
protect children and persons with mental disabilities from coming
into contact with sex offenders. The Register aims to achieve this
by serving as an information database for relevant employers,
licensing authorities, and childcare authorities (para [20]). Seen
from this perspective, the limitation on a sexual offender's rights
in terms of section 50(2) of the Act is reasonable and justifiable in
an open and democratic society (para [7]).
In reviewing these limitations placed on the rights of sexual
offenders, the adverse consequences that flow from having one's
name and details entered onto the National Register for Sex
Offenders, as well as the purpose and scope of the relevant
provisions of the Sexual Offences Act, the Constitutional Court
agreed with the finding of the Western Cape High Court, Cape
Town, that the mandatory inclusion of the names and details in the
National Register for Sex Offenders, of minor sex offenders who
had committed sexual offences against other minors or mentally
disabled persons, fails to adequately take into consideration the
best interest of child sexual offenders (paras [46]-[51]). And, the
limitation of the rights of child offenders in terms of section
50(2)(a) is, therefore, not justified in an open and democratic
society (para [51]).
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In reaching this decision the Constitutional Court emphasised
that section 28(2) of the Constitution underlines the paramountcy
of the best-interest-of-the-child principle and that the ambit of this
constitutional provision is 'undoubtedly wide' (para [35]). The
best-interest principle, read together with the provisions of the
Child Justice Act 75 of 2008, are furthermore reflective of the
individualised approach to child justice in South African jurispru-
dence and affirm the developmental nature of childhood and the
moral malleability and prospect for reform of child offenders
(paras [36] [38]). Justice Skweyiya, writing for the majority of the
Constitutional Court, also highlighted the fact that in terms of
section 50(2)(a) of the Sexual Offences Act, child offenders are
not afforded the opportunity to make representations to the court
before their details are included in the Register, while the guiding
principles of the Child Justice Act 75 of 2008 require that 'every
child should, as far as possible, be given an opportunity to
participate in any proceedings ... where decisions affecting him
or her might be taken' (s 3(c) of the Child Justice Act 75 of 2008;
para [40]).
The Constitutional Court consequently confirmed the order of
constitutional invalidity handed down by the Western Cape High
Court, Cape Town, declaring section 50(2)(a) of the Criminal Law
(Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of
2007 to be invalid insofar as it unjustifiably limits the right of child
sex offenders to have their best interest taken into account before
the inclusion of their names in the National Register for Sexual
Offences (Johannes v S 2013 (2) SACR 599 (WCC)). The
Constitutional Court also suspended the declaration of invalidity
for a period of fifteen months in order to allow Parliament to
correct the defect in the legislation, and directed that the
respondents provide the Registrar of the Court with a detailed
report on the persons whose names had been included in the
National Register for Sexual Offenders under section 50(2)(a) of
the Act, and who were younger than eighteen years of age when
they committed the offence which resulted in their inclusion
(paras [52]-[57]).
SECT[ION 76(4) (d) AND (e) OF THE CHILD JUSTICE ACr 75 oF 2008
AND A COURT'S JURISDICTION TO IMPOSE AN ALTERNATIVE SENTENCE
The resident magistrate at Nerina One Stop Justice Centre in
Port Elizabeth, Mr Goosen, was presiding over an automatic
review of S v Goliath 2014 (2) SACR 290 (ECG) in terms of section
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85(1)(a) of the Child Justice Act 75 of 2008, when he became
concerned about what was happening at a juvenile facility near
Bhisho (para [3]). An unannounced visit to the facility confirmed
that the facility was wholly dysfunctional to the extent that the
resident magistrate filed an urgent application citing, inter alia,
the MEC for Basic Education in the Eastern Cape as respondent.
The application ultimately resulted in the closing of the Bhisho
juvenile facility (paras [5] [6]).
At question in the present matter was the placement of the
children who had been sentenced to the Bhisho facility, and
particularly the plight of the accused whose case was sent on
special review citing the closure of the Bhisho reform school. The
trial magistrate indicated that he was functus officio as the High
Court had not set aside the accused's sentence and the magis-
trate was therefore - in his opinion and until the accused's
sentence had been set aside - unable to re-sentence the
accused (paras [11]-[13]).
In S vZand 23 similar cases 2004 (1) SACR 400 (E), it was held
that a court has the inherent power to review a sentence imposed
by a regional magistrate where juvenile offenders sentenced to
reform school had, 'by reason of administrative difficulties, been
detained elsewhere for unreasonably long periods before their
sentences were carried into effect' (para [14]). Likewise, in S v
Katu 2001 (1) SACR 528 (E), a reviewing judge set aside a
sentence previously imposed and remitted the matter to the
magistrate's court for a fresh imposition of sentence after it
transpired that the juvenile offender was still being detained in
prison pending his removal to a reform school fifteen months after
he had been sentenced. Both these cases placed reliance on
section 76(4)(e) and (d) of the Child Justice Act 75 of 2008 which
aims to prevent 'a child languishing in a prison or other place of
detention for longer than a month whilst awaiting transfer to a
Child and Youth Care Centre' and are therefore distinguishable
from the present matter where the accused had already been
placed and was resident in the facility to which he had been
sentenced before it was closed down (para [20]).
Judge Pickering of the Eastern Cape High Court, Graham-
stown, therefore agreed that the imposition of an alternative
sentence without the first sentence having been set aside on
review or appeal, is confined to the specific circumstances and
provisions set out in section 76(4)(d) and (e) of the Child Justice
Act 75 of 2008, and that once a juvenile offender has been
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placed and is resident in the Child and Youth Care Centre to
which he or she was sentenced, the trial magistrate becomes
functus officio as the court's jurisdiction has been fully and finally
exercised (paras [21] [22]). The only basis on which the sentence
of the present accused could, therefore, be amended was by
way of review or appeal (para [23]). The accused's sentence was
consequently set aside and the matter remitted to the regional
magistrate for sentencing afresh (para [26]).
ORDERING THAT A SUSPENDED SENTENCE NOT RUN CONCURRENTLY
WITH ANY OTHER SENTENCE IMPOSED
The accused in S v Maseti 2014 (2) SACR 621 (ECG) was
convicted of assault with intent to cause grievous bodily harm
and sentenced to eighteen months' imprisonment wholly sus-
pended for five years on condition that the accused is not
convicted of the same offence, murder, or culpable homicide
involving violence during the period of suspension. The sentenc-
ing magistrate also ordered that the suspended sentence was
not to run concurrently with any other sentence imposed (para
[1]).
Ordering that a suspended sentence not run concurrently with
any other sentence subsequently imposed is not permitted in
terms of section 297 of the Criminal Procedure Act (para [4]). It is
the prerogative of the court which proves the existence of the
previous conviction, to consider whether or not the suspended
sentence should be brought into operation and if so, on what
conditions (para [5]). The sentence in this present matter was
consequently amended by striking out the last sentence (para
[7]).
SUMMARY CONVICTION AND SENTENCE IN TERMS OF SECTION 108 OF
THE MAGISTRATES' COURT ACT 32 OF 1944
Section 108(1) of the Magistrates' Court Act 32 of 1944
provides a summary procedure for contempt of court where any
person wilfully insults a judicial officer or another official of the
court, or wilfully interrupts proceedings, or otherwise misbe-
haves. Once convicted, such an offender can be sentenced to a
fine of R2 000 or in default of payment, to imprisonment for a
period not exceeding six months. It is also possible for an
offender to be sentenced to imprisonment without the option of a
fine. Section 108(2) of the Act furthermore provides that where
section 108(1) had been invoked,
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the judicial officer shall transmit the matter to the registrar of the court
of appeal for the consideration and review of a judge in chambers, a
statement, certified by such judicial officer to be true and correct, of
the grounds and reasons of his proceedings, and shall also furnish to
the party committed a copy of such statement.
In S v Motaung (29/2014) [2014] ZAFSHC 108 (7 August 2014),
the accused was sentenced to six months' direct imprisonment
under section 108(1) of the Magistrates' Court Act, for wilfully
interrupting the proceedings of the court and wilfully interfering
with the proper functioning of the court (para [8]). This was
confirmed on review and the disruptive behaviour of the accused
was found to be clear and evident from the court record (para
[12]). However, with regard to the procedure set out in section
108(2) of the Act, the magistrate failed to set out the grounds and
reasons for the summary conviction and sentence in a statement
he certifies to be true and correct, and also did not provide a
copy of such a statement to the offender (para [4]). Instead, the
magistrate wrote a letter that bore his official stamp and signature
and detailed the events that had led to the summary conviction
and sentence in terms of section 108 of the Magistrates' Court Act
32 of 1944 (para [4]).
In considering the rationale in S v Nxane 1975 (4) SA 433 (0),
where it was held that the provisions of section 108(2) are merely
administrative in nature and do not constitute an indispensable
part of the section 108(1) proceedings, Judges Daffue and
Murray of the Free State High Court, Bloemfontein, found that the
failure of the magistrate in the present case to provide a
certificate as per section 108(2), did not constitute an irregularity
that would invalidate the section 108(1) proceedings (para [6]).
With regard to the failure of the magistrate to provide the offender
with a copy of the letter, the reasoning in S v Mitchell 2011 (2)
SACR 182 (ECP) was considered. In Mitchell, the reasons for
providing an offender with a copy of the section 108(2) certificate
was stated as twofold: To enable the offender to confirm the facts
stated therein, and to give the offender the opportunity to express
his or her remorse (para [15]). Yet, while it was clear from the
court record that the magistrate did not provide the accused with
a copy of his letter, Daffue and Murray JJ held that such a failure
also does not necessarily invalidate the section 108(1) convic-
tion, but can impact on the accused's rights. In this case,
however, the judges were satisfied that the accused's rights had
been adequately observed and protected as the magistrate had
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explained to the accused that his conduct amounted to contempt
and also explained the section 108 procedure of the Magistrates'
Court Act.
PAROLE
Determinate and indeterminate sentences and the right to be considered for
placement on parole
The appellant in Nyawuza vS(AR 262/13) [2014] ZAKZPHC 47
(16 September 2014) was convicted of murder and robbery with
aggravating circumstances and sentenced to an effective term of
35 years' imprisonment (para [1]). At the time these sentences
were imposed, the appellant was already serving an effective
fifteen-year term for murder and attempted robbery (para [2]).
The appellant subsequently applied for leave to appeal against
his sentence arguing that the court had misdirected itself in not
taking into consideration the fact that he was already obliged to
serve a term of fifteen years, and once he had completed this
term would have to start serving the term of 35 years' imprison-
ment (para [4]). This cumulative term of 50 years' imprisonment,
the appellant argued, was so severe that it induced a sense of
shock and warranted interference by an appeal court, especially
given the fact that he would have qualified for release on parole
after having served thirteen years and three months of his
indeterminate term of life imprisonment (paras [4]-[6]).
Judge Koen for the High Court, KwaZulu-Natal Division, Pieter-
maritzburg, first pointed out that parole provisions and when an
accused might be eligible to be considered for release on parole
are not a concern of a sentencing court (para [7]). Moreover, in
referring to the judgment in S v Mafoho 2013 (2) SACR 179 (SCA),
it was held that while section 73(6)(a) of the Correctional Services
Act 111 of 1998 provides that no prisoner shall be considered for
placement on parole unless he or she has served half of his or her
term of imprisonment and no more than twenty-five years before
being considered for parole, this did not render every appeal
dealing with sentences in excess of 50 years' imprisonment
academic (paras [8] [9]).* At issue on appeal remained 'whether
* Note that section 9(d)(iv) of the Parole and Correctional Supervision Amend-
ment Act 87 of 1997 provides that for imprisonment contemplated in section 52(2)
of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 a prisoner will have to serve at least
four-fifths of the term of imprisonment imposed or 25 years, whichever is the shorter.
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the sentences imposed were appropriate, regard being had to the
relevant legal principles' (para [9]).
On the question as to what an appropriate period of incarcera-
tion would be, the following can be gleaned from case law:
* A sentence of 25 years' imprisonment is generally regarded
as a very long term and should be imposed only in excep-
tional circumstances (S v Whitehead 1970 (4) SA 424 A
438F-440).
* A sentence of 30 years' imprisonment is an extremely severe
sentence (Mabunda vS 2013 (2) SACR 161 (SCA) para [7]).
* In Basson vS [2012] ZASCA 204 (para [14]), it was held that
the cumulative effect of two sentences passed by different
courts - 40 and 36 years respectively - was too severe and
parts of both sentences were ordered to run concurrently for
an effective term of 25 years to be served (para [17] of
Nyawuza case). With regard to a court's discretion to order
that sentences run concurrently, it was also noted that it 'is an
important and essential tool to introduce an element of mercy
and to ameliorate the unduly lengthy cumulative effect of
imprisonment' (para [18] of the Nyawuza case).
While it is trite that sentences imposed on charges arising from
the same facts and usually dealt with in the same trial can be
ordered to run concurrently, the overall length of incarceration
resulting from sentences imposed on separate occasions and
arising from separate instances, should also be considered to
avoid unduly lengthy and cruel sentences. To ameliorate the
cumulative effect of such sentences it can, therefore, also be
ordered that sentences run concurrently in whole or in part (paras
[19]-[21]). In this case, parts of the sentences imposed were
ordered to run concurrently to make for an effective term of 25
years' imprisonment (para [26]).
Section 276B(l)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 and the
fixing of a non-parole period
The appellant in Mogaga v S (A622/2013) [2014] ZAGPPHC
199 (26 March 2014) was convicted of murder, housebreaking
with the intent to rob and robbery with aggravating circum-
stances, unlawful possession of a firearm, and unlawful posses-
sion of ammunition. The trial court sentenced the appellant to life
imprisonment plus a further 27 years' imprisonment and further
ordered that the Department of Correctional Services should only
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release the appellant on parole after he had served at least 30
years of his sentence (para [2]).
With regard to the imposition of a term of life imprisonment plus
a further determinate term of incarceration, it was held that both
section 32(2) of the previous Correctional Services Act 58 of
1958, as well as section 39(2)(a)(i) of the current Correctional
Services Act 111 of 1998 provide that any determinate sentence
of incarceration be served concurrently with a life sentence or
another indeterminate sentence of incarceration (paras [6]-[14];
also see S v Mashava 2014 (1) SACR 541 (SCA)).
With regard to the non-parole period fixed in this sentence,
Judge Phatudi for the North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria, held
that in terms of section 276B(1)(b), such a fixed non-parole
period may not exceed two-thirds of the imprisonment term or 25
years, whichever is the shorter, and that the fixing of a non-parole
period should only be made in exceptional circumstances (paras
[17]-[22]). He also held that the facts prompting such a decision
to fix a non-parole period should be relevant to parole and not
only be aggravating factors relating to the crime committed. In
such a case the accused must also be afforded an opportunity to
address the court on the issue 'as to whether exceptional
circumstances exist which imperatively call for such an order to
be made and, if needs to be invoked, what an appropriate
non-parole period would be to order in the circumstances' (para
[22]).
Also see Steyn vS (A278/13) [2014] ZAGPJHC 268 (16 Octo-
ber 2014) and Zono v S (20182/2014) [2014] ZASCA 188
(27 November 2014).
Restorative justice as a requirement for release on parole
The Parole Board ordered that the applicant in Gwebu v
Minister of Correctional Services & others 2014 (1) SACR 191
(GNP) not be released on parole until he had made peace with
the family of the victim, who in this case resided outside the
borders of the Republic of South Africa (para [5]). Judge Eber-
sohn for the North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria, described this
parole requirement as follows 'This so-called "restorative justice"
concept is a fabrication of a process . . .The whole process is an
illegal concoction undermining the rights of prisoners to be
released on parole when they legally qualify for it' (para [5]).
An order was accordingly made for the Parole Board to place
the applicant on parole within 30 calendar days of the order
being made (para [9]).
356
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND SENTENCING
A COMPETENT SENTENCE ON A GUILTY PLEA IN TERMS OF SECTION
112(1) (a) OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT 51 oF 1977
Section 112(1)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act provides for an
accused to plead guilty to the offence charged at a summary trial,
and to be convicted of that crime. This, however, is only possible
in terms of this provision if the presiding judicial officer is of the
opinion that the offence does not merit punishment of imprison-
ment or any other form of detention without the option of a fine, or
a fine exceeding the amount as specified by the Minister from
time to time in the Government Gazette. Once convicted, the
presiding officer may impose a competent sentence with due
regard to the restrictions as set out in the provision.
In S v Govender(DR 242/2014) [2014] ZAKZPHC 54 (4 Novem-
ber 2014), the prosecutor accepted the accused's guilty plea in
terms of section 112(1)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act in that
she had contravened section 58(1)(b) of the Marine Living
Resources Act 18 of 1998 read together with regulations 22(1)(d)
and 27(1)(a) by being in unlawful possession of 67 shad which
she had sold without having the prescribed permit (para [2]). The
accused was subsequently sentenced to six months' correctional
supervision in terms of section 276(1)(h) of the Criminal Proce-
dure Act, with certain specified conditions including house arrest.
However, the magistrate immediately realised that this was not a
competent sentence given the restrictions of section 112(1)(a) of
the Act and referred the matter on special review in terms of
section 304(4) (paras [1] [3]).
Judge Ndlovu for the KwaZulu-Natal Division, Pietermar-
itzburg, agreed that house arrest 'is clearly and logically a form of
detention without the option of a fine as envisaged in section
112(1)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977' and cannot
therefore be competently imposed following a conviction under
section 112(1)(a) (para [6]). However, in referring to S v Cedars
2010 (1) SACR 75 (GNP), R v Harmer 1906 TS 50, and S v Zulu
1967 (4) SA 499 (T), Ndlovu J held that section 304(4) proceed-
ings need not be strict in accordance with law, but rather need to
be in accordance with justice. The circumstances of cases such
as the present do not always demand that the sentence imposed
be set aside due to a technical irregularity (paras [7] [8]). In
considering the facts of the present case the sentence was not
found to be in accordance with justice and the matter was
remitted to the magistrate to consider sentence afresh (para
[13]).
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DECLARING AN OFFENDER AN HABITUAL CRIMINAL IN TERMS OF
SECTION 286 OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT 51 OF 1977
The appellant in Trichart v S 2014 (2) SACR 245 GJ pleaded
guilty and was convicted on a charge of theft having stolen 900g
of cheese to the value of R66,99. Before imposing sentence the
court adjourned to allow the prosecution to obtain the SAP 69
which lists all the previous convictions - if any - of the offender.
The appellant's SAP 69 showed a total of thirteen previous
convictions dating back to 1988 and including various counts of
theft, housebreaking, and one count of robbery (paras [1] [2]).
The magistrate, in dismissing a probation officer's report recom-
mending that the appellant be sent for drug rehabilitation,
emphasised the long list of previous convictions and declared
the appellant to be an habitual criminal in terms of section 286 of
the Criminal Procedure Act (paras [5]-[15]).
On appeal Judge Vally for the North Gauteng High Court,
Johannesburg, first emphasised the important role that probation
officers play as officers of the court in the South African criminal
justice system.
The probation officers . . . perform a valuable task, one that is of huge
assistance to judicial officers. The roles performed by the two enjoy a
symbiotic relationship. The judicial officer considers factors such as
the interests of the convicted individual, the nature and gravity of the
crime(s) for which he or she has been convicted and the interests of
society. In considering the interests of the individual the judicial officer
receives invaluable information gathered by the probation officer and
has the benefit of the probation officer's expertise regarding the
psycho-social and other conditions and circumstances concerning
the offender (para [10]; also see Fielies vS(851/2013) [2014] ZASCA
191 (28 November 2014)).
With regard to declaring the appellant an habitual criminal in
terms of section 286(1), Vally J highlighted the far-reaching
implications of such a declaration, particularly when an offender
had already been punished for his or her previous offences. A
declaration in terms of section 286(1) must, therefore, only be
made after careful consideration of all the facts to ensure that all
the offences had indeed been committed out of habit, and that
the crimes were of such a nature that society required protection
from the offender for at least a period of seven years (para [20]).
Even if this was found to be the case, all other considerations,
including the nature of the offence, the interests of the offender,
358
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND SENTENCING
and the interest of society, must still be taken into account in
determining whether such a declaration is indeed appropriate
(para [20]).
In the present matter it was found that the declaration of the
appellant as an habitual offender was an unduly harsh punish-
ment for a minor misdemeanor and that the magistrate had not
taken into account the central role that the appellant's drug
dependence played in his criminal behaviour (paras [20] [22]).
TIME SPENT IN CUSTODY AWAITING TRIAL AS A SUBSTANTIAL AND
COMPELLING CIRCUMSTANCE WARRANTING A DEVIATION FROM A
PRESCRIBED MINIMUM SENTENCE
The three respondents in Director of Public Prosecutions North
Gauteng: Pretoria v Gcwala & others 2014 (2) SACR 337 (SCA)
were convicted of murder and each sentenced to an effective
term of twelve years' imprisonment. The state appealed against
this sentence arguing, inter alia, that the trial court had erred in
regarding the time that the three respondents had spent in
custody awaiting trial - a total of four years - as a substantial
and compelling circumstance warranting a deviation from the
prescribed minimum sentence in terms of the Criminal Law
Amendment Act 105 of 1997 (paras [1]-[8]).
The trial judge explained that he had taken the four years spent
in custody and doubled that number so that he deducted eight
years from each of the respondents' sentences he would other-
wise have imposed (para [10]). This is similar to what was
suggested in S v Brophy& another 2007 (2) SACR 56 (W), where
it was held that 'as a rule of thumb, imprisonment while awaiting
trial is the equivalent of a sentence of twice that length' (para [10];
also see S v Stephen & another 1994 (2) SACR 163 (W)). This
'mechanical' approach was rejected, however, in S v Vilikazi &
others 2000 (1) SACR 140 (W), S v Dlamini 2012 (2) SACR 1
(SCA), and S v Radebe & another 2013 (2) SACR 165 (SCA).
Judge Lewis, writing for the majority of the Supreme Court of
Appeal, also rejected this mechanical approach and emphasised
that the period spent in custody awaiting trial is just one of many
factors that should be taken into account in deciding upon a just
and appropriate sentence (para [16]).
SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPELLING CIRCUMSTANCES FOR A SENTENCE OF
LIFE IMPRISONMENT ON A CONVICTION OF RAPE
The appellant in S v FV 2014 (1) SACR 42 (GNP) appealed
against his sentence of life imprisonment for raping his daughter.
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The sentencing court found that no substantial and compelling
circumstances existed warranting a lesser sentence, but the
appellant argued that the following factors should have carried
greater weight: that he was 41 years old; a first offender; was
himself sexually abused as a child; that his wife was sexually
distant as she had been raped before; that the appellant was not
a threat to society; that his family was financially dependent on
him; and that the complainant still loved him as her father (para
[12]).
These factors, according to Judge Janse van Nieuwenhuizen
for the North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria, were not substantial
and compelling circumstances warranting a lesser sentence. The
fact that the complainant still loved her father was rather
regarded as an aggravating factor as it is 'indeed very sad that
the father [whom the child still loves] . . . deprived [the complain-
ant] of the privilege to lead a normal and fulfilled life' (para [17]).
The fact that the appellant failed dismally in his responsibilities as
a father was further emphasised by the fact that he had now,
through his conduct, left his family destitute (para [18]).
The appellant also did not show any remorse for his actions
(para [19]). Remorse, it was held, requires some insight into the
seriousness of the offence committed and should also be borne
out by the appellant's subsequent conduct. This was unfortu-
nately not the case here, as the appellant continued to shift the
blame to the complainant and was himself unsure about his
actions and how he could have raped his own daughter (paras
[21] [22]). The appeal was dismissed.
In S v AM 2014 (1) SACR 48 (FB), the appellant was also
sentenced to life imprisonment for raping his partner's daughter.
In this case it was argued that sufficient consideration had not
been given to the fact that the appellant was a first offender, was
40 years of age, and that the rape was not 'the worst kind' as the
complainant had not been seriously injured. Mocumie and
Sepato JJ for the Free State High Court, Bloemfontein, also
rejected these submissions as justifying a lesser sentence (para
[17]).
Similarly, in S v MS 2014 (1) SACR 59 (GNP), an appeal by the
appellant against a sentence of six terms of life imprisonment
handed down against conviction on six counts of raping his
(11-year-old) stepdaughter, also failed. In this case, the fact that
the appellant was 44 years old and did not have much schooling
did not count as mitigating factors, as it was found that he
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showed no remorse and the complainant had been severely
traumatised by the rapes (para [28]). It was further held that the
brutal and repetitive rape of the complainant over six consecutive
nights and her daytime flight from the appellant after which she
had lost lost consciousness, constituted the worst possible kind
of rape and therefore warranted the sentence imposed (para
[31]).
However, in S v SM 2014 (1) SACR 53 (GNP), the appellant's
sentence of life imprisonment was set aside and replaced with a
sentence of fifteen years' imprisonment for raping his fifteen-year-
old daughter. Factors taken into consideration were that the
appellant was a first offender, he had pleaded guilty, had spent
seven months in custody awaiting trial, and that the complainant
had not been kidnapped. The appellant's prospects of rehabilita-
tion were also considered (para [3]). With reference to recent
case law - S v MM; S vJS; S v JV2011 (1) SACR 510 (GNP), S v
EN 2014 (1) SACR 198 (SCA), and S v SMM 2013 (2) SACR 292
(SCA) - where it was reaffirmed that 'life imprisonment is the
ultimate and most severe sentence which a court can impose',
the court found that a lengthy prison sentence would 'properly
and proportionally take into account the seriousness of the
appellant's crime, the interest of the appellant and the needs of
society' (para [14]).
Also see MDT vS (2014 (2) SACR 630 (SCA).
FAILURE TO FOREwARN AN ACCUSED OF THE APPLICABILITY OF THE
CRIMINAL LAw AMENDMENT ACT 105 OF 1997
Where an indictment makes no mention of the applicability of
the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 and the possibility
of an accused being sentenced to a prescribed minimum sen-
tence, and the trial judge also did not warn the accused of its
applicability, such failure constitutes a fatal irregularity resulting
in an unfair trial in respect of the sentence (Machongo v S
(20344/14) [2014] ZASCA 179 (21 November 2014) para [10]). In
such a case the appeal court must consider the sentence afresh
and 'considering a sentence afresh must ineluctably mean
setting aside of the sentence of the trial court, inter alia, and
conducting an inquiry on sentence as if it had not been consid-
ered before. In other words, the appeal court must disabuse itself
of what the trial court said in respect of sentence. . .' (para [11]).
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SECTION 35(3) OF THE NATIONAL ROAD TRAFc ACT 93 OF 1996
AND THE AUTOMATIC SUSPENSION OF A DRIVER'S LICENCE
The appellant in S v Greef 2014 (1) SACR 74 (WCC) was
convicted of having driven a motor vehicle on a public road whilst
his blood alcohol concentration level exceeded the permissible
level as per section 65(2)(a) of the National Road Traffic Act 93 of
1996. The trial magistrate subsequently sentenced him to a fine
of R3 000 or six months' imprisonment, a further fine or six
months' imprisonment suspended for five years on appropriate
conditions, and also suspended the appellant's driving licence
for a period of six months in terms of section 35(1)(c)(i) of the
National Road Traffic Act 93 of 1996 (para [3]).
In an appeal against the suspension of his driving licence, it
was firstly emphasised that the noting of an appeal does not
suspend the sentence imposed and '[s]trictly speaking, the
suspension of a driving licence in terms of section 35(1) occurs
ex lege unless a contrary order is made in terms of section 35(3)
and the suspension is thus not pursuant to an order' (para [4];
also see S v Wilson 2001 (1) SACR 253 (T)). It was also evident
from the amendments made to section 35(3) by the legislator by
way of Act 64 of 2008 that a non-suspension order can only be
made once evidence under oath has been presented by the
prosecution and the defence. The lawmaker was, therefore, 'no
longer content for non-suspension to be ordered on grounds
which had not been properly established and tested under
cross-examination' (para [7]). And finally, it was emphasised that
while previously there was no limit on the circumstances to which
a court could have regard in determining whether a non-suspen-
sion order was justified, those circumstances have now been
limited by the legislator to circumstances relating exclusively to
the offence committed (para [8]). The fact that an offender's
driving licence is important for his or her work or family life is,
therefore, no longer a valid consideration in determining whether
or not a non-suspension order should be granted (paras [8] [9]).
In this instance, however, circumstances related to the offence
justified an order in terms of section 35(3). The circumstances
that the appeal court took into consideration in this regard
included the following (para [12]):
* The appellant in this case had had nothing to drink for some
five to six hours before driving.
* The appellant did not feel drunk and did not know that the
alcohol was still in his blood when he got into the car to drive.
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* No expert evidence was led as to whether a person of the
appellant's build and metabolism was likely to suffer any
significant effects from the level of alcohol in his blood.
* The appellant was to drive the vehicle for a very short distance
in a country town.
* The appellant was involved in a minor collision at a stop street
while he was driving the car and it was not due to negligence
or reckless driving on his part.
It must be noted that the automatic suspension of a driving
licence in terms of section 35(1) of the National Road Traffic Act
93 of 1996 must be distinguished from the discretionary powers
that a court has in terms of section 34(1) of the Act to order the
suspension of an offender's driving licence for such a period as
the court deems fit (para [10]).
